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Section 1. Introduction 
 
 “We’re not advocating to kick out chemicals, we’re advocating for safety,” Maya said to 
a room full of students at Antioch College in Yellow Springs OH. She was describing her 
advocacy work after the 2014 Elk River Chemical Spill (also known as the “West Virginia Water 
Crisis”) that affected residents of West Virginia. Maya’s talk presented the history of chemical 
leaks, controversies, regulations and changes in the Chemical Valley of WV. Circling back to her 
experience of growing up in St Albans, a town in the Chemical Valley, Maya said, “I just share 
my experience; I don’t want anyone in my community to go without food.” The implication that 
people will suffer in basic everyday ways without employment in the chemical industry mediates 
the message of change. Like Maya, activists working in environmental justice do not claim that 
they want to take jobs away by shutting down industry, but instead say that they want to make 
industrial work safer for workers and fenceline communities that are at risk. I interviewed Maya 
and other residents of West Virginia who had experienced the chemical spill about how the spill 
affected their lives.  Many of these narratives directly or indirectly call for environmental or 
social justice, but are also ambivalent or contradictory, seeking to negotiate a situation rather 
than eradicate it.  
Environmental justice issues are typically considered to be sited problems of racial and 
economic inequality, affecting people in close proximity to waste or industrial zones and 
industrial workers. One definition is that environmental justice aims to make equal the “the 
unequal distribution of environmental benefits and environmental harms, tracing how race and 
class (and sometimes gender and sexuality) profoundly influence material, often place-based 
inequities” (Alaimo 2010, 28–29). This definition does not say that the aim is to remove all 
environmental harm, but just to make equal its distribution so that environmental harms do not 
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disproportionately affect groups marginalized by their race or class. Stacy Alaimo attributes the 
birth of environmental justice to the civil rights movement, citing the history of race-based 
environmental contamination (2010, 29; 1989, 71). The 2014 Elk River Chemical Spill subverted 
this idea of racial environmental injustice by affecting 300,000 people across nine counties. The 
contamination crossed urban and rural boundaries, moving beyond the typical “fenceline” 
communities located directly beside an industrial or waste site, and exposing the river’s power to 
distribute the environmental harms of industry in the Chemical Valley.  
A utopian vision of environmental justice in which harm is eradicated assumes that there 
is a singular victim, person to blame, or problem. Narratives of environmental justice are often 
ambivalent or contradictory because there are always layered and intersecting problems and 
attachments during disasters. This paper looks at environmental justice response narratives to 
two disasters in Kanawha County, West Virginia – the 2014 Chemical Spill and the 2016 floods. 
Certain groups are disproportionately affected by environmental problems, but environmental 
justice asks for the acknowledgement that everyone is responsible for and effected by 
environmental pollution. Individuals and communities narrate their relationships to polluting 
industries through response to industrial and environmental disasters, demonstrating how these 
relationships facilitate or prevent them from moving beyond their individual attachments towards 
collectivity in the context of threats to our environment and population.  
In this paper I look at environmental justice narratives from the 2014 Chemical Spill and 
2016 floods in West Virginia. In section two I explain that environmental justice narratives after 
the spill are often ambivalent or uncertain because of trauma from exposure, personal 
attachments, and the requirement that environmental justice address structural issues. In section 
three I look at disaster relief narratives after the 2016 floods. These narratives are more certain 
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because they do not address structural problems and work within a shorter timescale. The current 
rhetoric around disaster relief is resilience, which assumes the presence of the disaster, putting 
the onus of change on the individual.  
 
Trajectory and Methods 
 
I became interested in the chemical spill in 2014 when it happened. I followed the news, 
Krysta Bryson’s videos and blog, i and I talked to my family about it. In May 2016 I started 
interviewing people about the spill. I realized early on that I could not just study the chemical 
spill. In late June 2016 West Virginia experienced widespread flooding, and I decided to 
volunteer as part of my research. During my research I would find out about other disasters that 
had happened recently or were ongoing. It caused me to think about the problem of defining the 
event: relief, multiple disasters, long term recovery, etc. How can I study two particular events 
when there are all of these intersecting events occurring? Using the chemical spill and the floods 
allowed me to compare the form of each disaster, and the respective disaster relief situation.  
For the chemical spill I conducted a few short semi-structured interviews, and during the 
flood I spent a lot more time with one individual because I worked in one women’s house. I also 
had many informal, off the record interviews and conversations that I attempted to capture using 
fieldnotes. To do research during the ongoing flood disaster, I used participant observation by 
volunteering, which I had not anticipated when I conceptualized studying the chemical spill. To 
volunteer for flood relief gave me a first hand look at the flood experience. Working with one 
individual for a longer period of time allowed for me to see the floods in a different way than if I 
had conducted only short interviews.  However, volunteering was not all deep engagement and 
connection. While in general the flood survivors and other volunteers welcomed me and my 
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interviewing with open arms, some people that I met outside of the volunteering situation either 
cast serious doubt on my intention, or on the other end of the spectrum, praised me beyond what 
was merited. At the end of the summer, I interviewed various officials at Army Corps, WVU, 
and the Department of Environmental Protection. I chose to include these people because so 
much of the controversy around both disasters was linked to official management of resources 
and industrial regulation.  
 
Section 2: The 2014 Chemical Spill // West Virginia Water Crisis  
 
The Chemical Valley is a river valley in Kanawha county that is populated with 
numerous chemical manufacturing plants, a region whose “narrative ratifies progress” (Hufford 
2002, 65). The chemical plants are located on the banks of the Kanawha River because the flood 
plain provided flat ground to build, in an area of unrelenting hills, near a dense deposit of salt. In 
the late nineteenth century, salt was an important culinary export and an essential ingredient in 
early chemical manufacture (Hufford et al. 2007, 51). In 1918 The US government built Nitro, 
WV over the course of one year ii in order to produce gunpowder (nitrocellulose) to supply the 
needs of WW1(Wintz 1985). The production of gunpowder in Nitro gave way to the production 
of chemicals. Although the chemical boom of the 1950s and 60s is over, the chemical industry 
continues to employ about 10,000 people in the state.  
The chemical industry at large has a legacy of disastrous accidents, most notably the 
1984 Union Carbide MIC leak in Bhopal India that killed upwards of 8,000 people. Industrial 
disasters are not just the big events we all know so well by name and place, like Love Canal, 
Hurricane Katrina, and Bhopal, India; they can also be smaller, slower, everyday occurrences. 
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“Slow violence” of chemical contamination is the harmful exposure that lacks the sudden 
timescale that characterizes a normative idea of violence (Nixon 2011). Sudden disasters can 
expose the slow violence of underlying, undetected contamination. The Chemical Valley in WV 
has long experienced chemical exposure and leaks of the slow and sudden kind. In the mid-
1980’s, a Monsanto Plant in Nitro, WV contaminated the Kanawha River by dumping dioxins 
into it.  The region is also the only place in the US that stores MIC. MIC-related leaks occurred 
there in 1985, 1990, and 1993.iii 
The slow threat of exposure became suddenly realized on January 9th 2014 when 
approximately 10,000 gallons of the chemical methyl-cyclohexanemethanol (MCHM) leaked 
into the Elk River out of a rusty storage tank located on its bank above downtown Charleston, 
WV. The leak entered the river just upstream of the drinking water intake, contaminating the 
water supply of 300,000 people across nine counties. MCHM is a chemical used to clean coal of 
heavy metal particulates before the coal is burned for energy. This chemical seeped into people’s 
homes and produced a sickeningly sweet smell of black licorice. Many people reported health 
impacts from the spill (Schade et al. 2015; Whelton et al. 2015; Savoia et al. 2015).  
 
Attachments to Industry  
 
I interviewed four people who had experienced the spill: two environmental activists, a 
Charleston-based entrepreneur, and a woman from Clendenin. I am defining activist as a public 
figure speaking for a community who opposes government or industry action. There is a general 
spectrum of activists within the consultants I spoke to in WV, but not everyone would agree on 
using the term “activist” to describe themselves. Maya rejects the term “activist” because it is 
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used to discredit and marginalize the actor. Elise is an activist that accepts the term; she states 
that anyone can be an activist simply by acting. Lewis invokes a sustainable mission for his 
business by revamping the former salt industry into a business with low energy inputs. Alice is 
like an “advocate”; she acts on behalf of the groups that she sees marginalized or forgotten in the 
disaster relief process. Public figures were often the most accessible because they had 
motivations to speak to me. They are the well positioned “cultural brokers”, people ready to 
explain their culture for outsiders (Noyes 2016b). These activists and advocates would narrate 
their attachments to work, industry, and family through their conceptions of environmental 
justice, inequality and the changing economy. These narratives show how attachments mediate 
solutions.  
Elise is a self-identified activist from WV who has been very active in anti-mountaintop 
removal activism, and is now a lawyer in Hinton, WV. She worked for flood relief during 
Hurricane Katrina, and experienced the 2014 Elk River Chemical Spill. She first heard about 
mountaintop removal (MTR) at Virginia Tech, a school that has a long standing relationship with 
Kayford Mountain in West Virginia, the home of activist Larry Gibson that is an intact 
mountaintop completely surrounded by mountaintop removal. Elise uses her family story to 
position herself as someone who has knowledge about the lives of coal industry workers. She 
explained, “My dad’s a boilermaker, my boyfriend’s a boilermaker. I am a product of the coal 
industry, of coal fired power plants. I have coal miners in my family. I am a firm believer that 
it’s a finite resource, its dirty, there are other alternatives and we will get to that point.” The fact 
that she is a “product” of this industry does not mean she wishes to preserve coal mining. The 
logic here is that she knows the inner life of coal mining, and because of that she has the 
authority to speak against it.  
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I met with Maya at Antioch College to talk about the chemical spill. She is originally 
from the Kanawha Valley, and now works with a group called People Concerned about 
Chemical Safety (PCACS), which grew out of the group People Concerned about MIC that 
formed after the leak in Bhopal. Maya’s turn toward activism grows out of her childhood 
experience of toxic exposure at home, coupled with the complicating fact that the chemical 
industry employed her father. She describes her memory of a chemical leak in her neighborhood 
in 1993, when she was in high school, during which she had to “shelter-in-place”. Sheltering in 
place because of MIC traumatized Maya, but it was additionally problematic because the 
chemical industry employed her father. The industry that “puts food on her table,” was also the 
industry that endangered her life. Similar to Elise’s story there is a cyclical logic to the stories of 
familial and employee attachment to industry. The industry creates you, and threatens to destroy 
you.  
The nostalgia of local and family history creates an attachment that prevents individuals 
from seeing industry as being in direct opposition to themselves. Nearly everyone I met had 
some connection to an extractive industry, folks that worked in timber, natural gas, and coal 
mining, and whose family worked in chemicals. Although my family has not historically worked 
in chemicals, we have family legends that circulate that say our family used to own all of the 
land in South Charleston, including Blaine Island. The story is that George Washington gave 
Fleming Cobb (my distant grandfather) the deed to South Charleston, who then divided the land 
up among his children. Someone in my family received Blaine Island (in the Kanawha River) 
and then sold it to Union Carbide. Even residents who are not presently tied to industry through 
work, are tied to industry through local history and family. 
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Lewis is an entrepreneur in Charleston who makes artisanal salt and is tied to industry in 
West Virginia through work and family inheritance. He is not an “activist”, although his business 
is intentionally low-input, meaning the salt is produced with passive solar heating instead of 
electricity or gas. Although his method of producing salt is different than the method used in the 
19th and 20th century salt industry, his company uses the heritage of the salt industry as part of 
their branding. Lewis told me that his family owns land in WV that is leased to coal companies. 
He had moved away for a while, but then moved back to take over the land leasing business, and 
to start a new family salt business. 
The 2014 chemical spill occurred during his company’s first year of production. He said 
the spill was “inconvenient and unfortunate” and that it would have been a problem if his 
company were a higher-producing business at the time. Lewis told me that there were more 
immediate issues in WV – specifically the decline of coal jobs, which affect every entrepreneur 
and business owner, because less money is coming into and moving around the state. In this 
conversation, Lewis is foregrounding the role of jobs and industry in WV, while stopping the 
conversation about the environmental injustice of the chemical spill. This is a strategy that 
extractive industries use, to “define themselves as the backbone of local and regional economies” 
(Bell and York 2010, 112). In the Kanawha Valley chemicals are the “backbone” of the region 
economically, but coal has a hold on the whole state. Lewis’s point is that coal jobs affect 
everyone’s economic future and that this creates a bind. The state has abundant natural resources 
– like water – which could provide an economic future. If the coal industry is needed to keep 
capital flowing into the state, then increased coal production would increase the pollution of 
water. This correlation is called the “treadmill of production” model, which “argues that 
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ecological destruction is intrinsic to capitalist modes of production” (Bell and York 2010, 113). 
The problem is that the perceived solution to getting away from coal often relies on coal.  
Many conversations I had in West Virginia would quickly become conversations about 
jobs. There is a preoccupation in the state with jobs because many people have lost good paying 
work because technological improvements have reduced the number of employees industries 
need and lower prices of materials coming from overseas undercut local industries. Mountain top 
mining employs fewer people than underground mining used to, combined with the fact that the 
US is not exporting coal. Many people told me that work is just not there – that timber is not 
being cut, that coal is not being exported, and that the chemical plants have layoffs. I never asked 
anyone specifically about jobs or work but by asking about environmental contamination, they 
understood that jobs were part of the picture. This flagged the assumption that people know 
about environmental contamination when they work in extractive industries, meaning that the 
problem is not a lack of information. Instead, toxicity is a known part of the job and it is part of 
the bargain or contract that workers make when they accept a job. In this sense, the problem is 
not that workers need to be educated about toxicity, because they know that toxicity is part of 
these industries. In these stories, work and family mediate the solution to industrial toxicity.  
 
Resource of Clean Water 
 
The “monoeconomy” of coal and chemicals has its hold in the state, but not everyone 
subsists only within these industries (Billings 2016, 59). Tourism is becoming the most recent 
boom for the economy in parts of the state. Newly elected Governer Jim Justice, who was 
running at the time of my fieldwork, ran on a platform that he would bring coal back, and that he 
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would create 16,000 jobs in tourism.iv Tourism in West Virginia is usually built around pristine 
mountain landscapes and water recreation. The maintenance of coal production beside the 
development of tourism relies on the assumption that these spaces can remain separate. Elise’s 
conception of WV’s economic future also prioritizes tourism, saying:  
Well it’s our only economy. If you then kill the water, then the gas is gone, nobody’s 
going to come vacation here. Fayetteville’s biggest economy is their rafting. Well there’s 
an injection well that is leaking radioactive water into wolf creek, which is just above 
were the rafting is. Nobody’s going to come to raft in Fayetteville if they think they’re 
rafting in radioactive water. That is part of the balance, which economy is better? Which 
one is long term? 
 
Elise can see the tenuous separation of these industrial and recreational spaces. 
Envisioning the economic future of WV is a popular topic, and it reveals a combination of 
personal values with an idea of what is possible and probable. Elise says that WV is “the water 
state” and that water is just pouring out of the hills in an endless supply. On the other hand, clean 
water is threatened. Elise describes how the natural gas industry is using up the clean water for 
natural gas extraction, because fracking requires the use of clean water in order to prevent 
unknown and unpredictable chemical mixing. Elise tells me that “they have used 17 billion 
gallons of clean water to frack. And they haven’t paid a penny for it.” She makes the point that if 
less than $.01 per gallon were paid to the WV government for this water, the state would have 
budget surplus.  
Using water to frack violates Elise’s vision of what clean water should be used for – 
personal use, drinking, or for shipping to western states. Her vision is that WV could use 
pipelines to sell clean water to states in the west that need it because of drought conditions. She 
asks, “How much will a gallon of water be worth? What would a pipeline of water be worth? 
What if we built a pipeline of water out of Pocahontas County and sent it out west, 17 billion 
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gallons of water, instead of using it frack and polluting it? 20 years from now they’ll be like, 
damn we should have put a price on the water. That was where the money was.” Elise is not 
alone is speculating about water as WV’s next big export. I spoke to university hydrologist Nick 
who said that major landowners in the state are discussing exporting water because they realize 
that coal is gone, timber is done, and natural gas infrastructure is not there yet.  
There’s very active conversations about WV selling water to the West. 2/3rds of the US 
is drying out, and that 2/3rds of the US that’s drying out is also where much of our food 
comes from. So think of this paradigm: WV is becoming wetter under climate change, 
more intense storms, hence more water. What happens if we well water to hipsters in 
Denver. Hipsters in Denver are not gonna want to buy acid mine drainage or alkaline 
mine drainage, surface mines and deep mines… They’re going to want to buy clean 
water. So in this really kind of weird paradigm shift, wouldn’t it be fascinating if climate 
change pushed WV to manage its water resources as a commodity to now sell out west. 
Like appropriate watershed management. 
 
Shipping water is presented as an economic solution that would also keep WV’s water 
clean, but the industry would be structured much like natural gas, with the use of pipelines. One 
problem would be who owns the water that is being shipped? Water from rivers are owned by 
the public. It is likely that shipping water would not change income inequality that is based in 
private ownership of natural resources in the state. The models of tourism and pipelines present a 
paradigm in which the power of outsiders’ money is enough to incentivize clean water where the 
needs of residents inside the state are not.   
West Virginia is perceived as always having a cultural and economic lack, and the 
solution to this lack is progress. Mary Hufford calls these solutions “rational and romantic 
regionalisms”; regional stereotypes reproduced by media and discourse (Hufford 2002, 64). The 
rational and romantic regionalisms position some spaces as needing industrialization and 
development, and other spaces as needing preservation. These regionalisms link place, time, and 
people (Noyes 2016a, 410). Shipping water and promoting tourism relies on this paradigm of 
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rational and romantic regionalisms, although the idea that extraction would protect water disrupts 
the assumption that industry is always polluting. The challenge to this model is that it relies on 
the separation of industrial contaminated spaces from pristine places that clean water would 
come from. As a model of environmental justice, the paradigm of shipping water seeks to 
remediate one problem (contaminated water) but not other structural problems like resource 
extraction, income inequality, and absentee landownership in the state.  
 
Urban and Rural Populations 
 
I interviewed Elise and Lewis about the chemical spill on the same day in June 2016. 
Lewis explained to me that the thriving whitewater rafting and resort industry was proof that WV 
has the best water in the world. Elise said that WV has the best water because it is abundant and 
clean, but that industry has cut residents off from accessing clean, readily available water. 
Lewis’s narrative suggests that rural parts of West Virginia are pristine; that rural populations 
have access to better nature than the city population. Elise’s narrative is similar, but that industry 
has taken away this access to clean water. Mountain springs are everywhere in West Virginia so 
they would seem like a common sense solution to access water during the spill, but destruction 
from mining disrupts access to this otherwise available water. Elise told me that during the spill 
some people did turn to mountain springs, drinking chemical contaminated water that was 
potentially worse than MCHM. She explained to me that industry has compromised the safety 
and availability of those springs:   
After about a week we were like, why are 9 counties on one water source? Oh, because 
local springs and streams have been buried or wells have been blown apart or you know 
all of these issues have happened around the mining industry. They’ve already 
contaminated the local water sources so the state, instead of addressing the pollution, just 
kept building the pipes out. 
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By “building the pipes out” the local government, mining industry, and private water 
company American Water were decreasing the self-sufficiency of West Virginians, causing 
people to be reliant on one private source of water (American Water Company).v It has been 
studied that steep and complex topography presents challenges to the ability of the state to 
govern, but in Appalachia the difficult terrain is removed for the coal seam underneath, and 
valley fills complete the leveling of the landscape (Scott 2009; Noyes 2014). Industry clears a 
path for government and development. The modernization of WV through coal mining and 
municipal water has forced remote populations to rely on water coming from the capital city.  
The message that city water was unsafe to drink was supposed to translate to all affected 
counties, but in this particular context, local knowledge of spring water could not be relied on for 
finding safe water. This reality conflicts with the romantic perception that rural West Virginians 
are able to be self-sufficient by living off of the land. The fact that rural populations were also on 
city water makes them similar to the urban population. These narratives demonstrate how the 
rural population is supposed to be different. Rural populations are supposed to be able to rely on 
local water sources and springs, but it is assumed as a given that urban populations would not 
have access to local water sources, or that they do not have the local knowledge about them.  
 
Women, Water, and Uncertainty  
 
Toxic exposure itself produces narratives of uncertainty because chemicals are usually 
invisible and a direct causation between chemical exposure and illness is not usually made (cite 
book). MCHM was visible, because of its strong smell.  The state government responded to the 
spill slowly, creating confusion and mistrust among residents. Krysta Bryson, in her Ohio State 
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dissertation, explains how confusion, controversy, and distrust were created after the chemical 
spill: 
A few of the major government missteps that occurred in the weeks during and 
immediately following the crisis:1) allowing a gap of at least eight hours between when 
the leak occurred and the public was notified and a Do Not Use Order was issued; 2) 
lifting the Do Not Use Order for the general population and then recommending pregnant 
women not drink the water; 3) drawing contaminated water into water buffaloes for 
emergency distribution in the affected counties; 4) establishing a “safe” contamination 
for drinking (and none for inhalation), without providing any scientific rationale (as was 
later found, none existed); 5) telling the public that their use of tap water was at their own 
discretion and refusing to declare the water either safe or unsafe; 6) cancelling public 
schools, re-opening some schools, and then sending children back home the same day 
when students and employees became ill from chemical inhalation; 7) discovering a 
second chemical was involved in the spill and not reporting this to the public until twelve 
days after the spill; 8) admitting that the storage tanks at the chemical plant had not been 
inspected by the DEP since 1991 and that chemicals in above ground storage tanks are 
not subject to any government regulations; 9) providing residents with arbitrary and 
dangerous flushing instructions and then later changing those instructions; and 10) 
despite public outcry at a press conference, the governor refusing to provide any in-home 
water testing and then later, only a few days later, agreeing to fund a $750,000 testing 
and assessment project (2015, 343–44). 
 
The officials in charge of disseminating knowledge about the chemical failed to 
communicate clearly, meaning the people affected by the spill did not know how to act in order 
to keep themselves safe. Students, activists and local people coordinated delivery of clean water, 
and made YouTube videos to make up for the lack of definitive information in the days after the 
spill. Krysta Bryson worked with a public health official to educate residents on how to flush 
their pipes safely.vi Contaminated water of the spill created a lot of anxiety around the health and 
futurity of West Virginians. Elise explains that from the stereotype of Appalachians as 
backwards or inbred, chemical exposure has been naturalized in Appalachian bodies:    
In recent years I talk a lot about the myth of the inbred hillbilly. We have this like, you 
know, were inbred, we’re back woods because all these birth defects and stuff, well, 
when you start putting the science together and you realize that if you’re exposed to coal 
chemicals you have a much higher instance of birth defects. Well now a days we have 
regulations that limit those but one hundred years ago there were no regulations, so the 
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instances were much higher, there was much more exposure, so the birth defects would 
have been much more prevalent, and what better way to marginalize a community than to 
say – oh them they’re inbred, don’t look there, you know that’s gross, don’t look there, 
they inbreed. Well… you’d have to inbreed for generations to get that level of birth 
defects because we were immigrants, I mean we’re a state of immigrants. 
 
The representation of Appalachians as having birth defects can be seen in films like 
“Deliverance”. Elise’s story sets up a familiar story – coal mining caused birth defects which 
caused coal mining communities to be stigmatized – but she directly places the blame on 
industry for this perception, as a way to take the public gaze off of the biochemical effects of 
coal chemicals. Her distrust is not in science nor her neighbors, but directly on the power that 
industry has in directing our gaze and persuading public opinions.  Citizens suffer because 
regulatory bodies do not make correlate industrial contamination and illness. 
Environmental controversies arise over who and what can produce and count as a source 
of “valid and reliable knowledge” (Gunter and Kroll-Smith 2007, 106). The chemical that leaked 
into the river affected people’s health in various ways. The regulatory organizations and 
industry’s lack of knowledge about the chemical led to a lack of official causation. The EPA and 
Freedom Industries did not know what effects MCHM would have on health because no studies 
had been done. Government and industry officials assumed that if the chemical was harmful, a 
study would have been done on it. The idea that citizens “didn’t know” but felt that there were 
effects did not translate into a government perception that the chemical was dangerous.  
The government did tell pregnant women that they should continue to not drink the tap 
water. The perception that the chemical was dangerous to pregnant women would be widespread 
in the narratives about the spill, stemming from the government warnings but also the fact that 
many stories circulated about babies showing more severe effects from coming into contact with 
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the chemical. In her YouTube video “West Virginia Water Crisis: A Long History of Pollution in 
WV”, Krysta Bryson talks about meeting a woman who had been washing her baby in the 
contaminated water after the MCHM spill. The woman said that her baby had severe eczema 
causing the baby’s scalp to crack and bleed. The woman said that when she switched to washing 
her baby in bottled water, the skin cracking went away. 
People Concerned about Chemical Safety and WV Free, a reproductive rights 
organization, teamed up to do “Women & Water listening sessions”, where they anonymously 
interviewed community members about their experience during the spill. The report depicts a 
strong distrust and loss of trust with government and regulatory bodies, but also a large concern 
about reproductive and children’s health (WV Free 2014). Women using motherhood as a form 
of activism are usually characterized as “emotional” or appealing to home, as opposed to being 
characterized as rational (Gunter and Kroll-Smith 2007, 122; Lemish 2000). Elise wasconcerned 
with reproduction and the chemical spill, both in general and with her own health. Her anxieties 
were expressed through a legend about biological change because of chemicals:  
Before the chemical leak, there were documented, an umbilical cord has three veins in the 
cord, a healthy one.  And in Charleston and in the chemical valley they’ve been seeing 
live births with two vein umbilical cords. Which is an adaptation, a mutation, basically to 
say, we can’t live here. We can’t reproduce. It’s the biology saying we’re changing how 
we reproduce to make it less likely we can reproduce because the environment is toxic. 
 
She noted that this story was anecdotal because it was not published research, but instead 
was told to her from nurses that do live births in the Chemical Valley. The idea that women’s 
reproductive capabilities in Chemical Valley are changing to respond to chemical hazards 
presents the woman’s body as most significantly marked by chemical exposure, not the baby’s 
body. This conception is that women’s bodies are permeable and are changing in response to 
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toxicity. Adaptation implies an active response, and mutation a more passive one, but either way 
in this story women’s bodies are showing the agency to stop the likelihood of reproducing in a 
continually toxic place.  
Stories of activism, economies, and women and children’s bodies after the chemical spill 
present different types of concerns, injustices, and solutions to the problem of industrial toxicity. 
There is a cyclical and ambivalent nature to these narratives that suggests we are not moving 
forward on a timeline of progress. Being a product of the region can create conflicting feelings 
about realizing the harm of the industry. The persistent exposure to these industrial contaminants 
can affect future generations, even if the extractive industries are gone. In this sense, the idea that 
progress necessitates preservation goes beyond the preservation of picturesque sceneries to 
preservation of human life. Environment justice does not come in one form meant to fix one 
simple problem. Many people are relying on innovative industries to protect clean water in the 
future; this being the closest idea to a utopian future, a strong economic model within the state 
that relies on the protection of natural resources instead of their removal.  
Elise talked about activist Larry Gibsons’s view on the environment: “That was one of 
Larry’s sayings, we all live downstream. You can contaminate the water upstream you know. 
The solution to pollution is dilution. Everybody says that. Push it out, push it out. But it ends up 
somewhere.” She is comparing two viewpoints on pollution. One, that we are all on the receiving 
end of pollution, and the other that manages pollution by diluting and distributing it. The logic 
behind these slogans are not completely in opposition, but they approach the problem differently. 
These slogans mirror the logic behind many of the environmental justice narratives I heard after 
the spill, and provide an epithet to understand rhetorical frameworks for environmental justice 
and disaster relief. 
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Environmental justice narratives are ambivalent and uncertain because chemical exposure 
itself produces uncertainty. In this case, governmental response to the exposure reproduced this 
uncertainty by exposing a lack of official information. Although the immediate response to the 
spill produced some consensus about blame and responsibility, this consensus would give way to 
different ideas about the problem and solutions. Individual attachments to work, industry, and 
immediate issues of family mediates ideas about solutions and models of justice. Environmental 
justice attempt to construct the problem as something that effects everyone – “we all live 
downstream”. However very often construction of the problem relies on narrating a problem that 
is specific to a particular population, or gender, race, class. Constructing a story that relates to all 
people is difficult because we narrate from within a world that is divided up into urban/rural, 
rich/poor, male/female, and one side of that binary is always more disadvantaged or susceptible 
to the harms of exposure.  
 
Section 3: 2016 Floods 
 
On June 23rd 2016, forty-four counties in West Virginia flooded, killing twenty-six 
people.  The flooding was especially damaging in Northern Kanawha and Greenbrier County. 
Clendenin, a town about 20 miles north of Charleston along the Elk River, was one of the hardest 
hit towns. Rivers in West Virginia tend to flood because of complex hydrology, topography, and 
climatology – steep slopes, shallow soils, and converging weather systems. The most baseline 
cause of flooding are the mountains themselves, which contain small, steep streams that can fill 
up quickly when it rains. What this means is that all of Appalachia is flood prone, not just certain 
areas, but areas are affected differently based on rainfall, land cover change, and flood control 
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measures. For these reasons river banks and mountain hollers have been historically difficult 
places to live in Appalachia. When absentee landowners bought up the mountains, they pushed 
people to settle toward these river banks (Hufford 2007, 73).  
The previous section looked at the narratives of environmental justice after the 2014 Elk 
River Chemical spill. This section will look at responses to the 2016 floods and other natural 
disasters in Kanawha County, West Virginia through stories from two flood survivors, a man 
living beside the Yeager Airport landslide, and two officials who work in flood research and 
prevention. Environmental justice and disaster relief have different goals, and work within 
different timescales and scope. Earlier I defined environmental justice as seeking the distribution 
of environmental harms and benefits. Disaser relief is about returning a situation to normal, and 
the dominant disaster relief rhetoric in the moment is resilience. If environmental justice is action 
targeted at a structural problem, resilience is a slogan-concept that assumes the cause is 
unchangeable, and that individuals must assume responsibility for individual recovery and 
growth in the face of a problem. Environmental justice narratives usually assert a group 
designated as victim and another as responsible, creating a framework to act against. Resilience 
narratives dilute victim and responsibility, and blur the line between the two. This section will 
compare disaster relief to environmental justice, and present a critique of disaster relief and 
resilience after the 2016 floods.  
 
Attachment to Family and Place 
 
A week after the floods occurred, I worked with Keeper of the Mountain, an anti-
mountaintop removal activist group, to deliver food to volunteer relief workers in Clendenin and 
Turley 22 
 
Bomont, a town north of Clendenin in Clay County. Arriving in Clendenin after the floods, the 
smell and sight of mud was overwhelming. I worked in Alice’s house ripping out floors, and 
getting to know her a little bit. Alice is a 66 year old woman who had lived in Clendenin most of 
her life. I told Alice that I was not sure I would be able to help her because I did not know how to 
do house demolition. She told me not to worry, there is always something I could do, like help 
clean the mud off of photos of her son. In the context of immediate disaster relief, I learned that 
the disaster event itself is not necessarily the biggest tragedy in a survivor’s life, and attachments 
to family, place, and the physical home, all play a role in decision making.  
After a disaster, people talk about their family as a resource, not a burden, in order to 
negotiate the stigma around their actions and experience (Bock and Horigan 2015). During a 
disaster it is expected that everyone should help themselves before helping others, which often 
does not happen because people do not want to leave family and pets behind. In Alice’s case, 
what would have been a resource for her was now gone. She felt stigma because she was not able 
to rebuild as quickly as her neighbors. By the time I got to her house, her direct neighbor had 
already gutted and rebuilt their house and was enjoying A/C inside their home while we were 
working. Alice’s son and husband had passed away, in 2012 and 2014 respectively, and she felt 
stigmatized for not being able to work like the volunteers could, and because she did not have 
men in her family to help her with anything.   
One day when I was driving back to Charleston from Clendenin, I decided to drive down 
Keystone Dr, the road that leads to the Freedom Industries site of the chemical leak. 
Unexpectedly, the road dead ended into pile formed from a landslide that had slid under the 
Yeager airport in Charleston, covering the road, a few houses, and a stream. There I met Tony, 
who was protesting the ongoing nature of the event at his home. He had constructed a sign that 
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said “Ground Zero, Still Here, 16 Months”, and every month that the landslide remained 
uncleared he would update his sign. vii Meeting Tony reminded me that in West Virginia there 
are industrial disasters happening everywhere, at different scales, sometimes just affecting a few 
people in a holler. Tony was speaking out through the use of his sign. He told me that ever since 
the landslide many people were coming down his street every day. Some days he would see men 
in suits talking about the landslide, watching it being hauled away by dump trucks. Other days, 
people like me would drive down the road not knowing the road was closed off.   
Alice and Tony’s motivations are not so much related to the industries their lives are 
connected to, but have to do with their individual experience of trauma and destruction, and the 
attacks on their home. Flood survivors are not stymied by ideological adherence to industry 
relations. Research perspective is that the flood occurred and was the disruption of daily life. For 
Alice, the most important disruptions in her life were when her son and husband passed away. 
The flood served more as a mechanism through which this other trauma would manifest and be 
explored. Alice’s personal loss quickly became the yardstick by which all other events were 
measured. When I asked about the chemical spill, she told me that at that time her husband was 
sick. When I asked about the loss of her house, she said it was already destroyed by losing the 
men in her life. These were the primary events, the flood being secondary. The flood was both 
my physical and narrative entry point into the inner life of this women I had just met.  
Alice often introduced her perspective on the floods by comparing it to her son’s death. 
We were talking about the effect the flood had on people’s gardens in Clendenin: 
But he has a nice garden this year. I mean I think people are trying to get back to the 
basics. You know and I think they will more, too, even after this flood. You know there is 
always something good. It’s just like when I lost my son. And people say, you know, for 
a reason. And I say no way, I don’t even want to hear that. Yeah you know how you hear 
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all that. It’ll be okay, you don’t never get through that. You don’t never get over that. 
You just learn to live with the hurt, is all you do. 
 
One interpretation is that Alice is saying that her neighborhood will recover from this 
flood, but she will not really ever recover from losing her son. Another interpretation is that she 
is drawing on the experience of losing her son, and saying that the neighborhood will remain 
changed forever like she has after her personal loss. 
 Tony and Alice both presented some ambivalence towards what had happened to them. 
Alice’s ambivalence stemmed from the loss of her family before the flood. Tony’s had a 
different form. He expressed to me that the airport had taken advantage of his family home (not 
his physical house, but the holler and other buildings owned by his family), but also that he liked 
having the holler to himself now that his pesky neighbors were mostly gone. He told me that the 
airport had made him an offer to buy his house, for more than he paid for it originally, but that he 
did not want to sell because he had put work into the house. He wanted compensation from the 
airport, but he did not want to leave.  
Ambivalence also stems from class based assumptions about homeownership and 
mobility. Some people view a house as an investment, where the purpose is to gain equity and 
sell it for more money. Tony is expected to up and move, because the airport offered him more 
money than the house was worth, discounting his emotional connection to his family’s holler. 
Alice is expected to repair her home but she feels ambivalent about this because she does not 
have men to help her repair the house or live there with her once it is completed. However, when 
FEMA provided funding for her to live in an apartment in Charleston while she rebuilt her home, 
her identification was with being a homeowner paired with fears of living in the inner city, this 
caused Alice to assert that she needed to use the money in a different way. She bought a camper 
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for her and her sister to live and parked it outside of her house. She told me she owned not 
rented. Her perspective towards the value of her house would shift in different contexts, but her 
identity as a person who owns their home and does not live in the inner city would remain 
constant. Deciding to rebuild or move after a flood does not really happen as an individual. 
Attachments to place, home, and family, as well as expectations from the community and 
government shape the way people act and make decisions after a disaster.  
 
Disaster Relief and Environmental Justice 
 
In order to better understand the hydrology and flood management of West Virginia, I 
met with a university hydrologist and an Army Corps engineer. University hydrologist Nick tells 
me about studying the relationship between coal mining and flooding in southern WV: 
Anecdotally people have said for years that surface mining increases floods… Starting in 
the 70s and through the 80s and 90s, surface mines got larger. Which meant they had to 
find places to put all that s[p]oil material, so they started using valley fills to store that 
material. So the activist side was of course mountaintop mining increases floods. And the 
industry side was like no, how could it increase floods, this is like an act of god. Both of 
those perspectives really weren’t founded in data, or the scientific process, and I don’t 
think the scientific process is the only way to come to answers, but when you have these 
polarized issues, the objective scientific process is a good way to bring information in to 
the conversation. So I started studying the impact of mountaintop mining on hydrology 
and in watersheds that I have studied. I’ve been really surprised to find that the flooding 
has not been increasing, in some cases it actually has been decreasing, because the valley 
fills offer more storage, for water to go… So now you’re forcing water to interact with all 
this coal bearing geology and chemistry, so now we have water quality issues 
downstream of your valley fill. So as a society do we want poor water quality or really 
flashy watersheds that can flood you out? 
 
 The question is whether or not, despite long standing inequities between citizens of WV 
and their dominant industries, putting communities and industries on an equal level goes far 
enough to render unstable the power discrepancies that exist. In either scenario, of flash-flood 
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prone watersheds or contaminated water quality from valley fills, the planner’s perspective is 
that people living in these hollers should move out. In this prescriptive solution, there is not 
much of a dialogue happening between these two perspectives. Decision making within the 
Army Corps, the federal institution tasked with flood control, moves even further away from the 
community based approach, and generally relies on a top-down, utilitarian approach that says 
small communities must adhere to what is best for the larger community, even at the detriment of 
their own home and community. Valuation of Army Corps programs are made strictly in 
economic terms, by how much money the dams have saved by preventing flood damage. By 
evaluating flood controls monetarily, the city centers naturally become the main target for 
prevention, because they contain the most expensive infrastructure to protect. Compare the 
cultural museum and gold-domed capital building in Charleston to a small collection of single-
story homes along the river bank. Federal flood control may actually strengthen structural 
inequalities between urban areas and rural areas upstream of the dams.  
Alice observed that the Elk River’s banks in Clendenin were eroding, and that the 
government was not interested in helping Clendenin in the way she saw Charleston being helped. 
Her idea is that the government should be overseeing the Elk more closely, they should be 
dredging the bottom of the river, like they do in Charleston near the Women’s and Children’s 
Hospital. Her concern was corroborated in an interview I did with an Army Corps Engineer and 
an employee of the Department of Environmental Protection. In one interview I was told that 
basically the Army Corps works primarily to prevent problems in cities like Huntington and 
Charleston. Additionally, the Elk River is considered too difficult to get to, and to work on it 
would necessitate building of new roads. There becomes no clear mediation between these 
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perspectives, because cutting out new roads could actually worsen conditions of erosion, 
flooding, and landslide risk.  
 In many of my interviews about the chemical spill and the floods, a salient feature was 
critique of disaster relief. Maya, Elise, and Alice critiqued the dominant relief method while 
claiming that their own local, grassroots efforts were cheaper, more efficient, and more 
equitable. The normative perspectives on disaster relief is that there is a humanitarian crisis and 
the situation needs to be brought back to “normal” or the way it was before (Redfield 2005). 
After the 2016 floods, national relief groups like the National Guard, FEMA, and the Red Cross 
came in to WV to help, as well as many national and local church organized groups like 
Samaritans Purse and Mennonite Disaster Service. These groups come in to remediate the 
situation, and locals and neighbors donate labor and goods to the cause. Disaster relief efforts are 
sustained for a while, but news media and general attention to the situation wanes as time passes 
or when disasters arise elsewhere. It is assumed from the outside that disaster relief brings towns 
back to normal.  
 What is disruptive of this paradigm is that the disaster does not end for a long time, and 
may not ever end for some people who remain in limbo for years and never return to their home. 
As of November 2016 some people in Clendenin are living in RV campers hoping they can make 
it through the winter in them. The way these non-local relief groups work is that they are sent to 
populated or accessible areas. During the water crisis this meant setting up in Charleston, Cross 
Lanes, or otherurban and suburban areas. This approach leaves behind people that are not mobile 
enough to make it to the city, whether that is because of transportation, age, disability, or lack of 
information.  
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After the flood, Alice had become an “advocate” for people less able than herself. She 
saw that elder, non-mobile, and very remote people may not have access to the distribution 
centers and free goods that were being offered. Alice took notice to this and used Facebook as a 
tool to rally support and supplies for people who did not have access by putting people’s names 
on lists and making requests for other people. Her deep concern was about “granny” up the hill 
who could not get to town to get supplies. She had to do a lot of work to get volunteering 
directed at her own home, and used those channels to make volunteers aware that less visible and 
less able people still needed help too. Alice was critical of free giveaways that privileged abled 
bodied people with cars. She compared the winners of giveaways to her current unfinished 
situation, saying that all those people probably have their homes fixed by now. In this example of 
disaster relief a structural problem exists in which the lesser-abled and disadvantaged population 
continues to have unequal access to materials they need. Alice is working towards a model of 
justice, not just short term relief. Similar structural problems with relief occurred after the 
chemical spill. Elise, drawing on experiences of Katrina and MTR activism, describes the gap 
that local understandings fill: 
We knew, because of our grassroots work in the mountaintop removal communities, 
where these back hollers were, where these people were up in these hollers. We leveraged 
that local network, and boom, we were getting water out in to those places. A week after 
the crisis, the Red Cross was setting up in Charleston, or in the population centers, they 
weren’t getting back out into those places. Those people might not be well, they might 
not have a car, or afford to drive 60 miles one way to pick up water, so we were filing a 
gap there that was necessary, and after working after the hurricane in New Orleans and 
after experiencing the water crisis, local grassroots nonprofit disaster relief is absolutely 
infinitely more impactful. We did more with 40k dollars than the Red Cross did with 4 
million. You know, because we knew where to take it. At one point the Governor’s office 
called the water hub and said, where do we need to take the water? 
The payoff for this story is that her group of lay and local experts became the official 
experts that the government came to rely on in order to help residents get water. The 
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“humanitarian” crisis of the chemical spill temporarily neutralized tensions felt between anti-
MTR groups and the state government. After the spill, an example of a “therapeutic community”, 
or a short-lived period of consensus and cooperation, appeared because of the emergence of a 
“pure” victimhood (Gunter and Kroll-Smith 2007, 127). Bryson comments on how this 
therapeutic community is formed, by saying “In the case of the water crisis, environmental 
melodrama created a clear and stark division in the Chemical Valley: the polluters and the 
public. This division is rarely observed because so many people are either employed by the coal 
or chemical industry or so entrenched in the pro-industry discourse they can’t see their own 
oppression.”(2015, 354). These communities are short-lived, giving way to problems that are less 
easy to find consensus on.  
Similarly, flood relief groups could only go where they knew they were needed, and they 
concentrated in areas with a high density of destroyed homes. FEMA volunteers took charge to 
get flood victims into safety and temporary homes. In narratives these workers and their actions 
are constructed as other and as having a lack of understanding of what was important. Paulette, 
Alice’s sister, describes FEMA after the flood: 
They sent people down here to help me. And I had pneumonia, I could hardly even talk. 
Sick. I was sicker than a dog. And I sat over on the porch in a chair while they brought 
stuff out. Well there was things I wanted to keep because my son is a collector of Star 
Wars, and he had a whole bedroom full of – you probably seen some of it over in that 
house – in crates… This one guy, he said: that place aint worth saving. It’s destroyed. 
Everything in it is. There’s no point taking it out. He said you’re sick you need to go to a 
hotel, or something, and rest. He called an ambulance, oh my lord, he just took over. He 
called an ambulance to come down here and check me out. He was doing all this behind 
my back [laughs]. Trying to take care of me. And he said I’ve called and got you a room 
in Dunbar for two nights, you’re going to a motel and rest. And you’re going to stop at 
Elkview Baptist Church and get you some clothes. He made me. Best looking thing you 
ever seen in your life. He was from London. Good looking – but anyway. He stood there 
with his arms crossed while I – big and tall, big man – while I got clothes. Then he went 
into the room with me and Alice to make sure it was cool. He told us he said, you can lay 
on the bed and watch the tele. Cause he’s from London! And he called and checked on 
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me for three or four days. He called me. He probably took me like his mom or something, 
I don’t know. He’s the reason I didn’t get that stuff out of there. He is the reason, he 
made me leave. There’s stuff in there that I could have saved. 
 
It is unclear just how upset Paulette is about not getting her stuff, but her story 
demonstrates the way that FEMA works as an authority over the disaster relief, often missing 
what is important to people’s lives. She needed his help because she was sick, but she is now left 
feeling like she had her things taken away from her.  
During the floods, survivors and volunteers noted that locals were better disaster relief 
workers. Local rescue abilities were being called upon at short notice because the floods were 
unexpected. A non-affiliated volunteer coordinator named Pam, who was always set up at Bill’s 
Used Auto in Clendenin every morning by 7:30am, sent me to Alice’s house. Local relief 
workers like Pam are survivors of the disaster themselves and are volunteering without any 
institutional support. They are “vernacular responders”, who are able to get around the 
“institutional traffic jam” (Ancelet, Gaudet, and Lindahl 2013). They do not have a bureaucracy 
to work within, but instead they work on what Alice called “common sense”. In Clendenin, a 
town with an aging population, local rescue abilities were called upon to help out members of the 
community that were known to be unable to help themselves. This included pets, which were 
often in dangerous situations because there was no time to prepare for evacuation, and many pet 
owners were away from home. Able men in the neighborhood, who owned boats (Clendenin is 
on the river after all) would use what they had to get people to safe spaces. Paulette described: 
She tell you about the guys going in boats getting people? They were going around 
getting all the older people in the bottom – older than us – and bringing them to the 
church… Yeah a local guy that lived up the road, and uh, he was going and getting the 
people, putting them in the boat and bringing them to the church. This woman was crying 
because her dog was in the house, and he went over there and got her dogs out of the 
house and it had water in it. The house had water in it already, but he went over and got 
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them dogs for her. And people was tying their dogs up. Like on this bank up through, to 
get it out of the flood. They went off they had to get out of here and the water got up 
around their dogs. And then the guys was having to go save the dogs. These guys was 
drinking beer – that was in the boat. Half tanked. They was having the best time they ever 
had in their life! It was something to do you know and they was helping. They was 
happy. It was crazy. It was a nightmare. 
 
Not all of the local rescue stories were “positive” because saving pets was not a universal 
goal during the floods. Dogs were not allowed inside the church in Reamer, and so Paulette had 
to keep her dogs in her car for days before she found a church that would allow them inside. She 
felt like she was at the mercy of these local decision makers, not being able to choose whether 
her dogs could coming inside or not. She said, “If you hit an animal or something you go to jail. 
But they won’t let them stay with you, what are you supposed to do, kill them? Just throw them 
out?” 
 These highly effective and efficient (although not always perfect) grassroots 
organizations are also extremely fragile. Speaking more about the floods than the chemical spill, 
most of these efforts centered around the energy of a single person, who may or may not work 
themselves beyond what is healthy in order to keep up with the need. When that person must 
stop, there is no one to take their place. I observed that there was a need for more locals to do 
this work in order that it does not all fall on one individual to maintain the effort. To utilize this 
local knowledge and ability, local organizations could be funded by larger groups like FEMA 
and Red Cross, but as they grow these groups would run the risk of changing from a small 
efficient group to a slow bureaucratic group. Despite this, people within this system claim that 
grassroots local organizations work better because they already have crucial local knowledge of 
topography, and because they bypass slow bureaucratic approvals.  
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Resilience  
 
 People hung flyers that read “#WVSTRONG” all over the town of White Sulphur 
Springs in Greenbrier County, home of the famous Greenbrier Hotel that is also the training 
camp for the New Orleans Saints football team. This hashtag, constantly present, demonstrated 
expectation that West Virginia communities would exhibit resilience in rebuilding after the 
flood. #WVSTRONG served as a rhetorical motivator, a “slogan-concept”, that suggested to 
survivors that they should exhibit their inherent strength of spirit and community by rebuilding, 
while obscuring the factors that would make that task difficult (Noyes 2016a, 413–15). The 
expectation that West Virginians be strong takes the problem of disaster as a given, putting the 
onus on residents to respond in a way that is acceptable to the community. Moving away without 
gutting and rebuilding one’s house would be a response to the flooding that would violate this 
expectation.  
“Creative destruction” is the companion to resilience, meaning that when something is 
cleared away, something new can emerge (Noyes 2016a, 417). I met with a tourism and real 
estate developer in the Charleston area, who wrote in the Charleston Gazette proposing that 
residents of river communities turn this flood into an opportunity to develop their rivers for 
kayaking.viii Within this vision, the flood provides two services; with their homes now destroyed 
people can move away from the dangerous flood zone,with the river banks now open tourism for 
kayaking can be developed bringing sustainable economies to struggling towns. I did not see this 
plan being enacted in Clendenin or White Sulphur Springs. Although this plan resembles the idea 
of removal-turned-enterprise that was seen in post-Katrina New Orleans, the writer of the article 
was encouraging that communities themselves take over as the role of developer for their own 
benefit. The aging population of towns like Clendenin may hinder the implementation of 
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economic development like kayaking services that rely on the physical abilities of younger 
people.  
 Community responsibility for themselves has become a common narrative. Distrust of the 
government is expressed through critique of federal programs like FEMA and Army Corps, 
through ignoring safety warnings during the chemical spill and the flood, and through WV’s 
federal and state election of non-politician, business-owning, candidates. Noyes argues that the 
resilience slogan-concept has indicated a new paradigm in which the façade of a greater social 
structure that takes responsibility for its citizens is disappearing, saying:  
In other words, we are on our own – and the creek is gonna rise. All of a sudden they are 
telling it like it is, and this is a change worth remarking. The public idiom of resilience 
evinces a loss of societal confidence in the modern progress narrative. Its rise indexes the 
decline of institutional willingness to assume responsibility for the collective wellbeing. 
We might call it abdication. (2016a, 420).  
 
Alice and Elise specifically remarked in the distrust they held toward their government. 
Alice told me that based on her experiences with the flood, and her son’s experiences in the 
military, that “this country is not ready for anything, not a war, not anything”. Elise remarked 
similarly that from her experiences with FEMA she knew that “the government was inept and 
not equipped for disaster”.  
Disaster relief generally has a clearly defined goal: to return to normal, and the rhetoric of 
resilience is what motivates residents to action (Rose 2007, 384). Local activists claim to be 
more successful at disaster relief because of specific local knowledge about communities and 
topography. Local activists are willing to try to look at a complete picture of the problem, as 
opposed to official groups whose knowledge is incomplete, and are unwilling to see the whole 
problem (Gunter and Kroll-Smith 2007). Local activist relief workers attempt to bring disaster 
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relief and environmental justice together by addressing physical concerns of disaster relief with 
an awareness of structural issues. Environmental justice needs to work within intersectional 
problems meaning solutions are often ambivalent, contradictory, or not widely agreed upon. 
Environmental justice activism and disaster relief are both responses to disasters but they work 
on different goals, assumptions, and timescales.   
 
Understanding Response and Attachment  
  
Fatalism is a common and often problematic explanation as to why Appalachian 
communities do not move or change after a disaster happens. This explanation says that 
Appalachians are distrustful in governmental organizations, and that they feel a loss or lack of 
control, coupled with the responsibility to be “resilient”. Nick describes the fatalism he sees, 
saying that he has encountered a particular community outlook after a flood that says:  
I’m not going to move from this hollow that 7 generations of my family have lived. I 
don’t care if it floods more, were just going to rebuild. And it’s out of our control. So 
let’s just become more resistant to change and dig our heels in deeper. So that makes our 
mountain communities more vulnerable to an uncertain future. Whether that uncertain 
future is because of climate change or change in industry or whatever. 
 
Residents are made vulnerable by staying in flood-prone and industrial zones, but are also 
made “resilient” by maintaining intact support systems via families and local communities. 
Resilience expects that people will capitalize on their destruction, despite facing emotional, 
psychological, and physical trauma.  
Facts produced by scientists are not always received as “true”. Nick sees this as “facts” vs 
“values”, where decision making based on values can be problematic. He told me, “that’s what 
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can be really challenging, because we should be making decision based on facts but we’re 
humans. What that means is that we can tell someone, you really shouldn’t swim in this river 
because of water quality issues, and they say well my family’s been swimming in this river for 
three generations, and we’re all fine.” This decision making is based on values and a continuous 
knowledge and experience of place and environment. How would displacement or change affect 
these models of decision making?  
After the 2016 floods, one community in White Sulphur Springs decided to move instead 
of rebuild in the same spot. With the help of Mennonite Disaster Service, a project called 
Mountain Hope was implemented in which a new community would be built on top of a hill 
instead of the floodplain. In this model, the environment would change but in theory the social 
connections would stay the same. Bryson sees this problem as one of access to history and 
information, saying, “people who know the history and recognize their own oppression are more 
likely to act than those who are not.” (2015, 349). I have argued that information about toxicity 
and disaster is not what is lacking, but instead we need to problematize the easy expectation of 
“action”.  Facing problems of industry, climate change, and natural disaster, we all have 
relationships to threatening industries and places that are difficult to leave behind because they 
create the lifestyles we are accustomed to. Although in West Virginia the problem is particularly 
salient in people’s relationships to polluting industry, the same problems are faced in every 
region of the country. 
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i Krysta Bryson has a PhD from the English Department at Ohio State.  
ii The back page of Nitro, the World War 1 Boom Town: and Illustrated History of Nitro, West Virginia and the 
Land on which it Stands:
 
iii News story about the 1985 leak: http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/12/us/toxic-cloud-leaks-at-carbide-plant-in-
west-virginia.html  
iv Article about Jim Justice’s promise of jobs in tourism: http://www.wvgazettemail.com/news-
politics/20160814/justice-marketer-in-chief-pushes-tourism-but-big-projects-difficult  
v History of WV American Water by student Gabe Schwartzman: http://wvwaterhistory.com/  
vi Krysta Bryson’s instructional video about MCHM flushing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rz3Y7rjnqEs  
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vii  
viii Article about developing kayak tourism after the floods: http://www.wvgazettemail.com/gazette-op-ed-
commentaries/20160806/bill-currey-eyes-on-the-river-to-turn-these-towns-around  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
